I want in this essay to pursue a line of thinking that departs from these ways of answering my opening question. I want, that is, to trace the suggestion that art has life, but not as we know it, in the thinking of Theodor W. Adorno. Adorno's frequent recourse to the suggestion that artworks are living is predicated neither on the kind of cultural optimism that points to a thriving art scene (no surprise there), nor on the mere analogy of artworks to things more routinely acknowledged as living. This second point is especially significant. That artworks might be said to share certain characteristics with beings that are accepted as having life-paradigmatically, perhaps, the human beings that create and behold artworks, but also other natural organisms-cannot serve as the ground, for Adorno, for speaking of artworks as alive. It is in fact no longer clear, according to Adorno, that human beings are themselves unquestionably alive. This is a leitmotif of Adorno's thinking-one that is frequently prompted in his work, incidentally, in connection with works of art-and it has specific consequences for the kind of existence that they themselves may be thought to have. 1 Crucially, the dissimilarity of artworks to human life, or, rather, to what passes for human life, is the condition of their own animacy. Putting it this way round-instead of saying that the life of artworks is not human-is essential to the case that Adorno wants to make. However, I also argue that by refusing to predicate art life on human life, Adorno does not simply sever all connection between art and humanity. On the contrary, art's nonhuman life intimates a true anthropomorphism.
In what follows, I first address the relation between "living experience" and the life of the artwork in Aesthetic Theory, since the account of this relation Adorno develops there implicitly concerns the suspicion that the life of art is just the result of anthropomorphic projection. Having established that the life of art cannot confidently be ascribed to the beholder of the artwork, I examine Adorno's claim that artworks have a "life sui generis" (AT 4) not predicated upon the life of their makers. It is here that the insistence that the life of art is not human life begins fully to emerge. Finally, I show that Adorno's conception of the life of artworks is substantially modeled on the idea of resurrection: on the idea, that is, of a life that is at once a radical transformation and recovery of a life that has gone before. the hidden seeds of survival question of aesthetic experience and its relation to the object in terms, specifically, of animacy and its potential sources. In doing so, he continues the critique of the enlightenment assumption that animacy is anthropomorphic projection, which he and Max Horkheimer formulated in Dialectic of Enlightenment. He also addresses a question latent in any attempt to argue for the life of artworks: just because the experience of artworks is felt to be animating, why should that entail that artworks themselves are alive? Adorno gives the following answer: "That the experience of artworks is adequate only as living experience is more than a statement about the relation of the observer to the observed, more than a statement about psychological cathexis as a condition of aesthetic perception. Aesthetic experience is living only by way of the object, in that instant in which artworks themselves become living under its gaze. . . . Through contemplative immersion the immanent processual quality of the work is set free. By speaking, it becomes something that moves in itself" (AT 175-76).
2 The possibility suggested here-that there is a kind of experience that is not living-is, of course, central to the whole of Adorno's philosophy. 3 Adorno does not view the life of art as a straightforwardly anthropomorphic projection because he does not prima facie accept that human beings are alive as they are.
Though this supposition has long been recognized as crucial to Adorno's thinking, it is nevertheless worth briefly elaborating its contrarian thrust. One is perhaps tempted in reading the epigraph "Life does not live" at the opening of Minima Moralia, for instance, to contend that, like it or not, human beings, when they are alive, are alive. Adorno, however, insists that "life" is a more ambiguous, and in fact more deeply riven category, than might be suggested by the assumption that it is determinable by taking a pulse. Life means more than life. 4 For instance, Marcel Proust's À la recherche du temps perdu (a work to which we will have cause to return below) is described by Adorno as "an appeal at law filed by life against life," a description that seeks to evoke Proust's attempt to resist accepted wisdom and to recover instead experience as it occurred. 5 The process of coming to an acceptance of universally acknowledged wisdom-the accumulation of experience, the attenuation of unrealistic ideals, the recognition that there is nothing more to "life" than its own course-might, indeed, be one definition of "life"; the recovery of a quite different kind of experience, of unexpected innervation, might be another.
All the more emphatic than the above description of Proust's novel, however, is Adorno's critique in Negative Dialectics of the philosophical fetishization of life itself in its most basic instantiations: "The less of life remains, the greater the temptation for our consciousness to take the sparse and abrupt living remnants for the phenomenal absolute. Even so, nothing could be experienced as truly alive if something that transcends life were not promised also; no straining of the concept leads beyond that." 6 Turning on its head the consoling apothegm that where there's life, there's hope, Adorno insists that only where there's hope is there life. This statement of the necessity to life of something beyond what it currently is, and concomitantly of the falsity of clinging to the putative remnants of life once all promise has been eliminated from it, emerges from Adorno's claim that implicit in Alban Berg's music-an insistent example for Adorno of the highest musical achievement-is the question, "Can this be all?" Music, in fact, seems particularly to express this sense that life is irreducible to sheer immediacy. Exactly how radically Adorno intends his contention that life without promise cannot be "experienced as truly alive" is suggested in his book on Gustav Mahler, where he refers to the affirmation of the possible as "the promise without which breath could not for a second be drawn." 7 Mahler is, for Adorno, the artist par excellence of this realization. Acknowledging that Mahler could hardly "escape the concept of 'Life,'" given its prominence in the vitalistic enthusiasm of his time, Adorno nevertheless distinguishes Mahler's violation of accepted standards of technical mastery from Richard Strauss's expertise in terms of their different relation to "life." Strauss's music is characterised by "the affirmative echo of vitalism," whereas Mahler "resembles the metaphysical philosophies that reflected the idea of life, [Henri] Bergson and the late [Georg] Simmel." In particular, Adorno goes on, "Simmel's formula of life as more than life does not sit ill on Mahler." 8 This does not mean that Mahler's music is merely an expression of a philosophical position-it would be ludicrous to try to determine whether Bergson and Simmel were in some way the sources of Mahler's music and hence its privileged explicans. Rather, it is the strictly musical characteristic of Mahler's work, his tendency to be drawn by the direction latent in his music, as opposed to the exercise of Straussian mastery, that echoes Simmel's conception of life being irreducible to sheer vitality. The life of Mahler's music is not in gratification, not in the exercise of vital force, but in its restless development beyond itself.
We will return to Mahler-and to Mahlerian duration in particularbelow. But for now it should be emphasized that for Adorno, life is such that it is not reducible to itself. There is no basic life. Or put another way, life reduced to its bases is not life in its purest, unadulterated form, but rather a drastically attenuated form of what it might fully be. This is a "life" that is called "life" precisely because any sense of what "life" might be capable of becoming has been lost. The assertion that there the hidden seeds of survival is no breathing without promise is thus, for Adorno, no exaggeration. Indeed it combines with the fact that in Negative Dialectics the question of the point of life is put into the mouth of "a desperate man who wants to kill himself." 9 No distinction between literal and metaphorical, bare and biographical life, is finally operative here. The withdrawal of the promise of possibility tends to the extinction of life, not its recognition as phenomenologically absolute.
This detour into Adorno's critique of human life as it is and of its assumed meaningfulness is necessary because it is implied in that critique that humans are disqualified from bestowing life on other things, including works of art. A being whose own life is open to question-a questioning that already reveals life's opposition to itself, since "[a] life that had any point would not need to inquire about it" 10 -cannot ascribe life to anything else. Hence, the systematic connection, as it were, between Adorno's skepticism concerning human life and his abiding sense that artworks are living inheres in the fact that our derangement concerning life entails that things whose putative life is in no way comparable to ours, might turn out to intimate the kind of life that we ought to have. Furthermore, the passage concerning the relation of living experience and the life of the artwork from Aesthetic Theory above short-circuits the transferral of animacy from observer to artwork-and, for that matter, vice versa. The object is responsible for rendering aesthetic experience living. But at the same time the object itself becomes animate only under the gaze of aesthetic experience.
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Much experience of artworks is procedural, reliant upon the academically sanctioned and "fully backed-up" processing of an object according to historical, philological, and other schema. 12 In such a case, the observer's mastery of the object is just as fatal to the life of her or his experience of it as it is to the object under scrutiny. Freedom from officially sanctioned critical procedure is freedom for both the object and the observer, even if the latter's freedom is paradoxically won via submission to former. The object is alive because under such conditions aesthetic experience arises thanks to the object's activity-an activity prompted by the observer's immersion within it. That moment, for example, at which a remembered line of verse becomes luminous-perhaps in unexpected or even inconvenient circumstances-is the moment at which aesthetic experience becomes living, but it is living thanks to the uncontrolled activity of the line itself in memory. According to Adorno, art thus participates in enlightenment's mortification of the world and in its dialectic. The artwork both confirms enlightenment's thesis about anthropomorphism-the life of the artwork is contingent upon our engagement with it-and at the same time discounts that thesis-even what human beings make comes to have a life of its own that we cannot fully account for. Encounter with artworks is not one in which the artwork is invested with properties otherwise wholly absent from it, or submitted to the techniques of academically sanctioned critical strictures, but rather one characterized by an animated passivity on the part of the beholder in relation to what becomes animate in its very recognition as such. 13 Adorno is thus acutely aware of the need to address the suspicion that the animacy of art is the result of mere psychological cathexis. This is a delicate task, since he also wishes to give due prominence to the role of experience, not just in aesthetics in general, but in the constitution of the work of art in particular. His most important attempt to deal with the questions that arise from this wish is in his essay "Valéry Proust Museum," where he pits these two important thinkers-important not just for the understanding of artworks, but for the understanding of artworks as in some sense living-against one another. Though commentary on this essay has not usually emphasized this aspect of the controversy, the central disagreement between Proust and Paul Valéry is, as we will see, about what it is for an artwork to live. 14 The essay, however, begins with death: "The German word, 'museal'['museumlike'], has unpleasant overtones. It describes objects to which the observer no longer has a vital relationship and which are in the process of dying. They owe their preservation more to historical respect than to the needs of the present." 15 It is Valéry who is in sympathy with this sense that museums are the mortuaries of dead culture. The lost connection between the works housed in them and "the immediacy of life" is, for Valéry, fatal to art (VPM 180). For Proust, on the contrary, it is only in the context of the museum that an artwork, severed from its functional context, comes into its "true spontaneity," which is registered in its profound effect on the individual observer (VPM 181). What Valéry and Proust advance are two different views of the life of art-if not, in fact, of life itself. The realization to which Valéry comes is that the curation of artworks in museums effectively amputates them, separating them from the organism upon which they depend for survival. They are reified and neutralized. Life for Valéry is usefulness, effectiveness, function-a conclusion at which he arrives not by way of the belief that art should a priori be engaged or committed (Adorno would hardly have countenanced a writer who held that view), but through the discovery that "the only pure works, the only works that can sustain serious observation, are the impure ones which do not exhaust themselves in that observation but point beyond, towards a social context" (VPM 180). Life for Proust, on the contrary, is innervation, stimulation of the observer's consciousness. As such, Proust is concerned not with the life that art once the hidden seeds of survival had in a functional context-a lifeworld, we might say-from which it has been excised, but with its second life, its afterlife-a life that is not a continuation of its former life, but a departure from it. 16 As readers of Adorno might expect, the dispute between Valéry and Proust is not adjudicated by coming down on one side or the other, but by noting that a particular conception of art emerges between the two writers-where "between" is not a featureless mean, but the point at which both theories pass over into each other. It is at this point, that is, that we can begin to see the importance to Adorno of refusing to model art life on human life. What Adorno praises in Valéry, in opposition to Proust, is his insistence that art is not ultimately referable to the observing subject. "Few things have contributed so greatly to dehumanization as has the universal human belief that products of the mind are justified only in so far as they exist for men" (VPM 182). We will return to the way that Valéry's antihumanism holds out the promise of a true humanism. But it must first be noted that Proust is not simply blamed for his ultimate reference of artworks to the pleasure of human observers, rather than to their role within a human functional context: "Works of art can fully embody the promesse du bonheur only when they have been uprooted from their native soil and have set out along the path to their own destruction. Proust recognized this. The procedure which today relegates every work of art to the museum, even Picasso's most recent sculpture, is irreversible. It is not solely reprehensible, however, for it presages a situation in which art, having completed its estrangement from human ends, returns, in Novalis' words, to life" (VPM 185). Commenting on the famous opening scene of Du côté de chez Swann, in which the narrator recalls slipping into sleep as a child and thereby blending with the subject-matter of his bedtime reading, Adorno remarks that "this is the reconciliation of that split which Valéry so irreconcilably laments. The chaos of cultural goods fades into the bliss of the child whose body feels itself at one with the nimbus of distance" (VPM 185).
The point I want to draw from this, however, is less that Proust's and Valéry's positions "pass over into one another" (VPM 183), and more that Adorno's avowal of the life of artworks is predicated upon a fundamental uncertainty about human beings-the uncertainty as to whether they are really alive anymore. Skepticism concerning the human as a privileged source of life is, as we have already seen, a key motif in Adorno's thinking. Against such a background, seeking solace in nonhuman objects can no longer be dismissed as a reifying denial of the vivid pulse of human life in all its gaiety and wealth. In an affecting essay on the mentor of his youth, Siegfried Kracauer, Adorno notes an absence in Kracauer's thought that might otherwise have drawn censure as a serious intellectual omission: "One looks in vain in the storehouse of Kracauer's intellectual motifs [Motivschatz] for indignation about reification. To a consciousness that suspects it has been abandoned by human beings, objects are superior. In them thought makes reparations for what human beings have done to the living. The state of innocence would be the condition of needy objects, shabby, despised objects alienated from their purposes."
17 It is not simply that Kracauer's consciousness neglects to mount a critique of reification; on the contrary, his consciousness is itself a venue for the collection and custody of objects-it is, that is, a "storehouse." This storehouse is in some ways a lonely one, but it is nevertheless supplied with the alluring objects that human society has discarded and disdained, like yesteryear's unfashionable knickknacks. 18 In fact, the hint of childhood recollection in this passage is striking. The fear of abandonment is counterbalanced, first of all, by the somewhat furtive delight at being let loose in a storehouse in which objects, precisely because of their desuetude, are innocent and thus capable of expiating the guilt of what has been done to those that have made them. Their innocence is their ignorance of the purpose meant for them by their progenitors and employers.
The Proustian tenor of Adorno's essay on Kracauer-the experience of solace in objects, the atmosphere of childhood recollection-perhaps unsurprisingly in view of my earlier discussion of "Valéry Proust Museum," finds its complement in Adorno's extended appreciation of Valéry's philosophy of art, especially as intimated in the collections translated as Windstriche and Über Kunst. 19 As if it were an intensification of Kracauer's disappointed turn from the human, Adorno declares that "Valéry's humanism denounces the vulgar demand that art be human" (NL 1:162). Valéry's humanism-which rejects the insistence that the human as it is should constitute the measure of all things-is a true humanism. There is, that is to say, a specific conception of humanity at work here, one that is not referable to really existing humanity. Adorno reiterates this point in Aesthetic Theory: art's "humanity is incompatible with any ideology of service to humankind. It is loyal to humanity only through inhumanity toward it" (AT 197). 20 Valéry's denunciation of the insistence that art be human is central to the conception of the life of art that can be drawn from his thinking. "Works of art," Adorno remarks, again glossing Valéry, "acquire life only when they renounce their likeness to the human" (NL 1:163).
It is at an important early juncture in Aesthetic Theory that Adorno attempts to specify quite what it is that makes the life of art distinct from human life, as well as, for that matter, from the life of natural objects: the hidden seeds of survival Although the demarcation line between art and the empirical must not be effaced, and least of all by the glorification of the artist, artworks nevertheless have life sui generis. This life is not just their external fate. Significant artworks constantly divulge [kehren . . . hervor] new layers, age, grow cold, die. It is a tautology that, as artifacts, human productions [Hervorbringungen], they do not live immediately as humans do. But the emphasis on the artifactual element in art concerns less the fact that it is manufactured than its own inner constitution, regardless of how it came to be. Artworks are alive in that they speak in a fashion that is denied to natural objects and the subjects who make them. (AT 4-5) 21 As we have seen, the putative immediacy of human life is no guarantee that it is in fact all the more truly life. What Adorno specifically calls "immediate life" is, in fact, held to be tantamount to its opposite: "where it is entirely present, entirely itself, it reveals itself as given up to death." 22 The passage from Aesthetic Theory above repeats Valéry's injunction against humanism in art, but it also develops Adorno's interpretation to the effect that that injunction fosters a true humanism.
In order to bring out the way in which the similarity and difference between artworks and human beings are held in tension in this passage, we may turn briefly not to Valéry, but to Proust. At one point in À l'ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs, Proust's narrator is led into an "uninhabited" drawing room (where he is to wait before tea with Mme. Swann and Gilberte) by a footman who does not, so far as the reader is told, say anything. There, the narrator was "left in the company of orchids, roses, and violets, which, like people who stand waiting beside you but do not know you, did not break the silence [gardaient un silence], which their individuality as live things [leur individualité de choses vivantes] only made the more striking." 23 While this example may seem starkly to contrast with Adorno's emphasis on the difference of artworks from natural objects-natural objects such as orchids, roses, and violets, perhaps-and from people-people who stand beside us but with whom we are not acquainted, for example-it in fact helps to bring into view a number of important aspects of Adorno's argument. First, the plants are not "live things" primarily or, indeed, at all by dint of their natural biological functions. Rather, constitutive of their life for Proust's narrator is their implied ability to speak, to break the silence that, since in fact they do not speak, becomes all the more noticeable. For the narrator of À la recherche, flowers are by no means natural objects in sheer opposition to artworks, nor, to repeat, is their life characterized by mute photosynthesis, respiration, pollination, and so on, but by the fact that they bear meaning (which they may withhold from us) in themselves. What is clear from the previously quoted passage in Aesthetic Theory is that, like the flowers in Mme. Swann's drawing room, artworks have the capacity to speak, and it is this capacity that constitutes their life.
It may here be objected that Proust's plants do not speak (though it is felt that they could), whereas Adorno's artworks do (though what they say, we are not told). Furthermore, the orchids, etc., are explicitly compared to people, which would seem to run counter to Adorno's insistence that the life of artworks resides in their ability to speak in a way that is closed to human subjects. But the people in the passage from Proust are people that we do not know, who are closed to us, prevented by social convention from making themselves knowable, and are thus reduced to membership in the amorphous mass of strangers. The flowers are both modeled on people in a society that erects barriers between them despite their physical proximity, inhibiting understanding and even affection. At the same time they are nevertheless people that bear the possibility of an as-yet undiscovered human encounter. Comparably, for Adorno, what artworks say is not directly comprehensible-"artworks," we are later informed, "speak like elves in fairy tales" (AT 126)-and concomitantly the life that they have as speaking things is not one that we yet share. 24 The artwork's ability to speak and its life are intimately connected. 25 Artworks, as Adorno remarks just after the passage quoted above, "speak by virtue of the communication of everything particular [alles Einzelnen] in them," in such a way that their speaking is strictly irreducible to what they say.
It is in the speech of artworks that their fundamental connection with natural beauty inheres. The relation between art objects and natural objects in this passage from Aesthetic Theory is, however, explicitly disavowed. This disavowal is nevertheless not the final word on this relation, any more than Adorno holds that the denial of the power of speech to humans and natural objects is final. First, to be sure, in claiming that artworks divulge new layers and that they thereby age, Adorno recollects a moment in Hegel's Aesthetics in which Hegel both contrasts natural objects with artworks, and emphasizes the status of art as a kind of product distinct from nature: "For the products of all the arts are works of the spirit and therefore are not, like natural productions, complete all at once within their specific sphere; on the contrary, they have a beginning, a progress, a perfection, and an end, a growth, blossoming, and decay." 26 The contrast is striking because the characteristics of growth, blossoming, and decay seem in fact to be typical of natural products and thence metaphorically transposed to artworks. Hegel, however, rejects that transposition. What he implicitly claims here is that the growth, blossoming, and decay of artworks constitute what they are as what they are (so to speak), whereas natural growth, etc., is in a fundamental sense accidental to natural productions, which have an external relationship to their coming-and ceasing-to-be. the hidden seeds of survival In the passage in which he claims that artworks "age, grow cold, die," Adorno is thus seeking to establish a distinction, inspired by Hegel's, between the life course of art and that of natural objects. Adorno, however, hardly takes over Hegel's relegation of natural beauty in general; on the contrary, that relegation is perhaps the chief object of criticism in the section on "Natural Beauty" in Aesthetic Theory. Hegel's deafness to "the speech of what is not significative" (AT 75) is fatal not only to his appreciation of natural beauty, but moreover to any understanding of the relation between art and nature. In speaking, artworks are not merely exercising a capacity that natural objects simply do not have; rather, "art wants once again to attain what has become opaque to humans in the language of nature" (AT 77)-a language to which we are now deaf because, on the Baconian rack, nature just tells us what we think we want to hear. Artworks do not, therefore, imitate particular instances of nature-the miscarriage of most attempts to do that is a testament to this claim-but rather what has been rendered mute in nature as such.
In a passage that begins with an important formulation for this essay's focus on the relation of artworks to the human, Adorno illustrates this point with the example of Anton von Webern's music: "With human means art wants to realize the language of what is not human. The pure expression of artworks, freed from every thing-like interference, even from everything so-called natural, converges with nature just as in Webern's most authentic works the pure tone, to which they are reduced by the strength of subjective sensibility, reverses dialectically into a natural sound: that of an eloquent nature, certainly, its language, not the portrayal of a part of nature" (AT 78). The distance of Webern's works from musical attempts to capture birdsong or waterfalls emphasizes the point that it is natural sound, and not particular natural sounds, that is heard in his music. What is striking in the above passage is that it is art that deploys "human means" to realize its ends, rather than those means being employed by the artist as such. Hence also in Webern's music "the strength of subjective sensibility" becomes nature. As we saw earlier, the artwork's artifactuality means that it cannot be said to live as human beings do. It is central to Adorno's aesthetics in general that the artifactuality of artworks as a mere marker of their human provenance is insignificant and belongs rather to the artwork's own constitution. This is not at all to claim that artifactuality itself is insignificant, but to argue, on the contrary, for the centrality of that feature of the artwork to the emergence of its own particular life. That the artwork takes over its own artifactuality is thus a token of the life it has in excess of the human production of, or investment in, it. * * * It is worth briefly recapping certain aspects of the argument I have been making. Artworks are alive, for Adorno, and not by mere analogy with human persons. Instead, Adorno advocates Valéry's refusal of the requirement for art to be human and, furthermore, views this refusal as the condition of art's life. We have also begun to see what art's life is: the life of art is mortal.
This insistence on art's mortality runs counter to versions of the life of art that construe it as duration, where duration means a kind of cultural immortality modeled on bourgeois conceptions of established property. According to Adorno, art's primitive connection with the attempt to render the transient durable is itself "accompanied by consciousness of its futility, perhaps even that such duration . . . was tied up with a sense of guilt toward the living" (AT 280). Fixation on durability thus mistakes the sources of art's life: "Confusion occurs between what a detestable nationalist exhortation once called the 'permanent value of artworks'-everything dead, formal, and neutralized in them-and the hidden seeds of survival" (AT 28). 27 In this context, it is an acute irony that those for whom permanent value is the measure of all things-art included-cannot tolerate long works of art. Conjuring the image of the frequent-flier businessman, Adorno remarks that "those who have survived Mahler by fifty years flinch at his works as the habitués of air travel shrink from a voyage by sea." But what they are flinching from is really their own accelerated mortality: "Mahlerian duration reminds them that they have themselves lost duration; perhaps they fear that they no longer live at all. They fend this off with the important man's superior assertion that he has no time, which lets slip its own ignominious truth." 28 The permanent birthday party for imperishable cultural goods is proof against ever having to endure an artwork itself. The demand of Mahlerian duration-as of other works from which expurgation would be fatal-that the work itself be encountered refuses the supposed satisfaction derived from knowledge that works persist.
But if the life of art is not chiefly characterized by mere duration as such, then is it merely fleeting? Commenting on Adorno's contention that the essay as form "tries to render the transient eternal," J. M. Bernstein claims that "the oxymoron of rendering the transient eternal is figurative; the transient . . . can have all the weight, all the substantiality, all the objectivity and bindingness that was once believed to be the prerogative of the necessary and universal." 29 Even if it downplays the, indeed, oxymoronic intention of Adorno's statement by viewing it figuratively, this reading nevertheless rightly emphasizes the importance to Adorno of a radical reevaluation of the ephemeral. In the context of his aesthetics in particular, Adorno emphasizes that the recuperation of the hidden seeds of survival the ephemeral is not mere extension, but transformation and recovery in one. The radical distinction Adorno draws between immortal duration and resurrection is especially important here. "Only something that has been mortal," he states, "can be resurrected" (NL 2:28). And resurrection is, it would seem, the only possible source of the life that Adorno envisages for art, since duration, by contrast, must immobilize (read: kill) what it perpetuates.
Adorno makes this clear in the closing stages of one of his two essays on Goethe-both of which, incidentally, address the meaning of classicizing conceptions of durability and the alternatives to them that emerge in Goethe's work. Commenting on the final scene of Faust, Adorno remarks that "the power of life, as a power of continued life, is equated with forgetting. It is only in being forgotten and thereby transformed that anything survives at all. . . . Hope is not memory held fast but the return of what has been forgotten" (NL 1:120). Thus Goethe anticipates the Proustian search for temps perdu: "The idea of immortality is tolerated only in what is itself, as Proust well knew, transient-in works of art as the last metaphors for revelation in the authentic language" (NL 1:184). Significantly, the remarks on Goethe and on Proust come at the conclusions of their respective commentaries. These termini are, of course, the points at which Adorno gives up his own contact with the work-both his own work in which he is engaged and the work of the writers he is in the process of discussing-relinquishing his grasp on it, at least for now. It is at precisely such moments in the course of commentary that the immortality of the transient is liable to be realized. A kind of life that drastically transcends humans as they are, and yet is offered to them as the fulfillment of their humanity; a kind of life requiring the radical transformation of the corrupt body, yet not eschewing the bodily altogether: resurrection is, in fact, a remarkably apt way to think about the life of art. The refusal to be amenable to humanity on the part of art is the intimation of a humanity that might yet come to be, by means of a refusal to conform to humanity as it is. In its renunciation of the human, therefore, art figures forth what is confected, rejected, and believed impossible by enlightenment disavowals of myth: a true anthropomorphism. 
University of Cambridge

